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In spite of intense efforts on the part of developing nations, commercial
banks, multilateral financial institutions, and the United States and other
governments over the past six and a half years, the international debt crisis
persists with few signs of amelioration. Since the crisis erupted in 1982, total
external indebtedness of the developing countries has increased from $831
billion to an estimated $1,320 billion in 1988.1 The total external debt of the
highly indebted countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ivory Coast, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, The
Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia) amounted to $529 billion at
the end of 1988.2 Per capita income of the highly indebted developing countries
has fallen dramatically during the 1980s, as much as 5 percent per year in some
cases, in spite of six years of economic expansion in the industrial countries.
3
Net financial transfers to the highly indebted countries, that is, the excess of new
loans over debt service payments, has been estimated at a negative $11 billion in
*Partner, Sidley & Austin, New York; Adjunct Professor of Domestic and International Banking
Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DEBT TABLES 1 (1988-89).
2. Id.
3. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK ATLAS: POPULATION, PER CAPITA PRODUCT AND GROWTH RATES
(1988).
605
606 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
1987. 4 In light of these statistics, it is not surprising that social and political
turmoil in these countries is increasing as evidenced by the riots in Caracas in
February of 1989.
Ironically, although experiencing a period of sustained domestic economic
growth, the United States has become in recent years the world's largest debtor
nation. At the end of 1987, the net international investment position of the
United States was a negative $400 billion, as compared to a positive $260 billion
for Japan and $165 billion for Germany. 5 Some of the capital flowing into the
United States is coming, of course, from the developing nations. For the first
time in fifty years, foreigners earned more in 1987 on their investments in the
United States than Americans earned on their investments abroad. In brief, the
Third World has sunk deeper into debt, per capita income has declined, and
developing countries that should be importing capital to fuel economic growth
are exporting it to the developed nations.
Fortunately, U.S. commercial banks have during this same period substantially
increased their capital and dramatically increased their loan-loss reserves, so that
they are now in a much better position to absorb any losses that may result from
their LDC loans. As a result, after years of tedious debt reschedulings and forced
new money exercises, the commercial banks have now moved beyond the
"muddling through" stage and have begun actively to manage and reduce their
debt portfolios.
Instead of passively holding on to their debt for what could be forever, banks
have begun aggressively to pursue various alternatives in the management of
such debt:
1. Selling debt in the secondary market, at increasingly greater discounts;
2. Swapping debt of one sovereign nation for that of another in order to
concentrate their debt in those countries with which they feel most comfortable;
3. Converting debt into equity investments in the debtor nations; and
4. Exchanging debt for securitized and/or collateralized debentures or other
debt instruments.
Because of their relatively weaker capital positions and greater desire to main-
tain a long-term financing role in the debtor nations, the money-center banks
generally have been less willing and able than regional banks to sell or trade their
LDC debt. Straight debt sales or debt swaps, both of which will result in sub-
stantial losses to a bank, are thus less attractive to money-center banks than to
regional and foreign banks. By contrast, conversion of debt to equity interests may
be more attractive to money-center banks than to regional banks because such
conversions usually involve less of an accounting loss, require a long-term interest
or commitment to the developing countries, and necessitate a continued presence
4. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FIRST REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING WORLD BANK
STRATEGY AND LENDING PROGRAMS IN DEBTOR COUNTRIES 18 (Mar. 1989).
5. Mossberg, New "One Worlders" Are Conservatives, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
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in developing countries that most regional and foreign banks lack. Thus, in terms of
their goals, the banks tend to fall into two categories. One group of banks seeks to
cash out its loan positions and take whatever losses may result, while the other is more
inclined to convert some of its debt into equity or other debt instruments that may
provide a more profitable and flexible long-term investment than existing debt.
The primary goal of the debtor nations is to reduce the amount of principal
and/or the rate of interest payable on their debt so that their remaining debt can
be serviced under reasonably normal circumstances without undue adverse effect
on economic growth. The amount of reduction of principal and/or interest
necessary to accomplish this objective will vary greatly depending upon the
particular circumstances of each country. No single scheme for debt relief, if
available to banks on a voluntary basis, is sufficient to enable the debtor nations
to meet their interest obligations comfortably. Nonetheless, significant debt relief
can be accomplished through a combination of debt/equity conversions, debt-
forgiveness arrangements similar to the recent Mexican debt exchange offer (the
Mexican Debt Exchange), debt buy-backs, and/or reductions in the rate of
interest payable on the countries' debt.
The quickest and most efficient way to achieve meaningful debt reduction is
to enable the debtor nations to capture to the fullest extent possible the discount
at which their debt is selling in the secondary market. Such discount ranges from
96 percent for Peru, down to about 40 to 45 percent for Chile and Colombia, the
better credit risks in Latin America today. 6 If banks are willing (as many have
been) to sell their LDC debt at the substantial discounts prevailing in the
secondary market, debtor nations should be encouraged to acquire their own
debt, thereby cancelling and eliminating the accompanying debt service obliga-
tions. Debt/equity conversions and exchanges similar to the Mexican Debt
Exchange are also designed in part to enable debtor nations to capture some of
this discount for their own benefit.
The new U.S. debt policy announced by Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas
Brady on March 10, 1989, recognized publicly for the first time the United States
Government's belief that debt reduction (i.e., forgiveness of part of the principal
on the LDC debt) is essential to the solution of the debt problem. 7 To implement
such debt reduction proposal, Secretary Brady encouraged the debtor nations and
their creditor banks to undertake several types of transactions:
* debt buy-backs;
* exchanges of old debt for new longer-term collateralized debt instruments;
and
" debt/equity conversions.
6. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERIM REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL
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To facilitate and encourage such debt reduction transactions, Secretary Brady
proposed that The World Bank and International Monetary Fund dedicate a
portion of their policy-based loans to replenish reserves used by the debtor
nations to buy back their debt and to finance the purchase of collateral to secure
new collateralized debt instruments issued in exchange for old debt. Secretary
Brady also suggested that The World Bank and IMF could provide additional
financial support to collateralize a portion of the interest payments (such as
twelve months of interest payments on a rolling forward basis) on new debt
issued in debt reduction transactions.
Participation by a U.S. commercial bank in a straightforward buy-back by a
debtor nation of its debt does not raise complicated legal or accounting issues for
the banks. The banks would simply sell their debt at a discount from its par value
(and perhaps the carrying value on its books), suffer the resultant accounting
loss, and make the appropriate adjustments, if any, to its reserves. Debt/equity
conversion transactions and debt exchanges involving new collateralized bonds,
which are two of the more promising and innovative approaches to managing and
reducing the LDC debt, do, on the other hand, involve substantial legal and
accounting issues for U.S. banks, and these issues are analyzed in the following
sections.
I. Debt/Equity Conversions
A. THE STRUCTURE OF A DEBT/EQuITY CONVERSION
The simplest, most straightforward debt/equity conversion occurs when a
creditor of a company exchanges or converts the debt owed to it by such
company for an equity interest in the same company. Such conversions are not
common since they require that the creditor itself have an interest in acquiring
equity in its debtor. Such interest is likely to exist only where a foreign parent of
a local subsidiary seeks to capitalize the loans it has made to the subsidiary.
Debt/equity conversions are more likely to occur as a two- or three-part
transaction. First, a foreign bank creditor holding public sector debt sells such
debt to the Central Bank of the debtor country for local currency equivalent in
amount to the face value of the external debt, or at some pre-established
discount. The bank creditor then takes such local currency and uses it to acquire
an equity interest in a company in the debtor country. This is essentially what
Bankers Trust did when it converted approximately $60 million of Chilean
public sector debt (consisting partly of debt that Bankers Trust held in portfolio
and partly of debt that it purchased from other lenders) into shares of a Chilean
pension fund and an affiliated insurance company.
Some bank lenders may not be interested in converting the debt they hold into
equity and, indeed, may be prevented from doing so by applicable banking
regulations. A three-step transaction involving a multinational corporation may
instead be effected. The foreign bank lender initially sells public sector (or
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possibly even private sector) debt to a multinational company, usually at a
significant discount depending upon the particular country involved. The
multinational corporation then exchanges, usually with the debtor nation's
central bank, such dollar denominated debt for local currency equal in amount to
the face value of the debt exchanged or at some fixed or auction-determined
discount. Finally, the multinational company invests the local currency in a
domestic company, which may well be its own subsidiary.
B. UNITED STATES BANKING LAWS AND REGULATIONS
AFFECTING DEBT/EQUITY CONVERSIONS
1. The Basic Framework
The acquisition of an equity interest in a foreign company through a
debt/equity conversion or otherwise by a U.S. banking organization may be
subject to the Federal Reserve Act (FRA),8 the Bank Holding Company Act
(BHCA), 9 and Regulations K 10 and Y 1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (the Board). Pursuant to section 25 of the FRA, a member bank
may invest directly in Edge Act corporations 12 and Agreement corporations.'
3
Since a member bank generally may not own directly other types of foreign
equity investments, the acquisition of stock by a U.S. banking organization
usually must be effected through a bank holding company (BHC) or through an
Edge Act corporation.
Section 4(c)(13) of the BHCA permits BHCs to acquire shares of any foreign
company that:
does no business in the United States except as an incident to its international or foreign
business, if the Board by regulation or order determines that, under the circumstances
and subject to the conditions set forth in the regulation or order, the exemption would
not be substantially at variance with the purposes of [the BHCA] and would be in the
public interest. 14
Section 25(a) of the FRA provides for the establishment of Edge Act
corporations and authorizes them to engage in activities overseas that the Board
considers to be usual in connection with the business of banking in foreign
countries. 15 Edge Act corporations may also, with the consent of and subject to
the regulations of the Board, own shares of any foreign company provided that
such company is "not engaged in the general business of buying or selling goods
...in the United States and [is] not transacting any business in the United States
8. 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-631 (1982 & Supp. VI 1988).
9. Id. §§ 1841-50.
10. 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.1-45 (1988).
11. Id. §§ 225.1-.43.
12. 12 U.S.C. § 615(c) (1982).
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except such as in the judgment of the Board . . . may be incidental to its
international or foreign business.
' ' 6
The Board has set forth extensive regulations implementing the foregoing
provisions of the FRA and the BHCA in Regulation K. 17 Since Regulation K will
govern most debt/equity conversions, the pertinent provisions of Regulation K
will be described in detail below.
In addition to section 4(c)(13), several other provisions of the BHCA may be
relevant to the acquisition of an equity interest in a foreign company. Section
4(c)(6) of the BHCA permits a BHC to hold not more than 5 percent of the
outstanding voting stock of any company, irrespective of the nature of its
business and where it engages in such business.' 8 Additionally, section 4(c)(7) of
the BHCA permits a BHC to hold shares (without any percentage limitation) of
an investment company, provided that such company is engaged only in the
business of investing in securities and that it does not hold more than 5 percent
of the outstanding voting stock of any company.' 
9
Finally, a U.S. banking organization may acquire an equity interest in a company
without limitation as to the nature of the business of such company or the percentage
amount of voting stock being acquired if such acquisition is necessary to prevent a
loss on a "debt previously contracted." Such "dpc" exception to the general limits
on the acquisition by banking organizations of equity interests in companies is found
in the National Banking Act, 20 the FRA in respect of Edge Act corporations, 2 1 the
BHCA,22 Regulations K23 and Y24 and various state banking laws.
2. Regulation K
On February 18, 1988, the Board announced a major liberalization of
Regulation K designed to facilitate equity investments by U.S. banks in foreign
countries through the use of debt/equity conversions. 25 This amendment ex-
panded the scope of an August 1987 amendment to Regulation K, 26 which
permitted banks, through debt/equity swaps, to own up to 100 percent of
nonfinancial companies acquired from the government of a heavily indebted
developing country. The prior liberalization, which permitted banks, in effect, to
buy privatized companies, had been criticized widely as being of limited use and
16. Id. § 615(c) (1982).
17. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5 (1988).
18. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1982 & Supp. VI 1988).
19. Id. § 1843(c)(7).
20. Id. §§ 21-213.
21. Id. § 615(c) (1982).
22. Id. § 1843(c)(2) (1980 & Supp. 1988).
23. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(e) (1988).
24. Id. § 225.12(b).
25. Id. § 211.5(f), 3 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 31,451 (Mar. 4, 1988).
26. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f) (1988), amended by 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f), 3 Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 31,451 (1988).
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perhaps even misguided in its ultimate effect. The new amendment extends the
authority, already generally available to banks under Regulation K, to make
certain equity investments through debt/equity conversions.
a. General Equity Investment Authority
Regulation K sets forth the Board's long-standing policy that foreign invest-
ments made by BHCs, member banks, and Edge and Agreement corporations
(which are collectively defined in Regulation K, and will be referred to hereinafter
as Investors) pursuant to the BHCA and the Edge Act should be limited primarily
to organizations whose activities are "confined to those of a banking or financial
nature and those that are necessary to carry on such activities."
(i) "Permissible Activities." Regulation K sets forth a list of those
activities that are considered "usual in connection with the transaction of
banking or other financial operations abroad" and that are considered to be
"permissible activities." These include:
(1) commercial and other banking activities;
(2) commercial and consumer finance;
(3) lease financing;
(4) providing investment, financial or economic advisory services;
(5) data processing;
(6) managing a mutual fund that does not exercise managerial control over
the firms in which it invests;
(7) management consulting;
(8) underwriting or distributing securities outside the United States; and
(9) activities the Board has determined to be closely related to banking under
section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA.
In addition to these listed permissible activities, the Board, upon application
by an Investor, may approve other activities if the Board finds them to be banking
or financial in nature, or finds that other financial institutions in the foreign
country in question engage in such activities, and determines that for competitive
reasons Investors should also be permitted to engage in such activities.
(ii) Eligible Investment Levels or Categories. An Investor may acquire up
to 100 percent of the voting stock of a foreign company provided that 95 percent
or more of its activities are listed permissible activities or have been specifically
determined to be permissible by the Board. An Investor may also acquire lesser
amounts of voting stock in a company even though it engages to a significant
extent in nonpermissible activities. More specifically, an Investor may make
investments in the following types of companies to the extent indicated:
(a) Acquire more than 50 percent of the voting stock of a foreign entity or
acquire control of such entity (a "subsidiary" investment), provided that
at least 95 percent of such entity's assets or revenues relate to permissible
activities that are enumerated in Regulation K or have been determined
by the Board to be permissible;
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(b) acquire 20 percent or more of the voting stock of a foreign entity but not
a controlling interest (a "joint venture" investment), provided that at
least 90 percent of the assets or revenues of such company relate to
permissible activities;
(c) acquire less than 20 percent of a foreign entity (a "portfolio invest-
ment") irrespective of what activities the company engages in, provided
that the aggregate amount of all such portfolio investments by the
Investor does not exceed the Investor's capital plus surplus.
(iii) Requirement of Divestiture. An investor will be required to divest an
investment (unless the Board authorizes retention) if the company in which the
investment is made (a) engages in the general business of selling goods, wares,
merchandise, or commodities in the United States; (b) engages directly or
indirectly in other business in the United States that would not be permitted to an
Edge Act corporation; or (c) engages in impermissible activities to an extent not
permitted by the regulations. Thus, in addition to making sure that the company
in which an Investor seeks to invest fits within one of the eligible investment
categories, an Investor must also make sure that such company's activities in the
United States are narrowly circumscribed.
Even if a foreign company's activities in the United States exceed such limits
so that investment in such company would not be permitted under Regulation
K, nonetheless, an Investor can always hold up to 5 percent of the voting stock
of such company pursuant to section 4(c)(6) of the BHCA regardless of its
activities.
(iv) Notice and Consent Requirements. Depending upon the magnitude and
nature of the proposed investment, an Investor's acquisition will be subject to the
Board's general consent procedure or to its prior notice, or specific consent,
procedure.
Assuming that an Investor's proposed investment fits within one of the
subsidiary, joint venture, or portfolio investment categories described above, no
prior notice need be given to the Board of the proposed investment if the
investment in such entity does not exceed the lesser of $15 million or 5 percent
of the bank's capital plus surplus.
An investment that fits within one of the three investment categories, but
exceeds the level permitted for general consent, may be made pursuant to the
prior notice procedure. Under this procedure, the Investor must give the Board
forty-five days' prior notice of its intention to make such investment, during
which time the Board may object to the investment.
An investor must seek the specific consent of the Board to an acquisition if its
proposed acquisition does not come within the general consent or prior notice
provisions. Such consent is essentially required where the Investor seeks to
acquire more than a portfolio investment in a company whose activities are not
included within the Board's list of permissible activities.
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b. The February 1988 Amendment
The February 1988 amendment liberalized the authority of BHCs to make
equity investments in developing countries through debt/equity conversions by:
(i) increasing the amount of equity ownership a BHC may have in a nonfinancial
company; (ii) permitting the BHC to provide loans, in addition to equity, to such
company; (iii) extending the time period during which the equity investment may
be retained by the BHC; and (iv) liberalizing the general consent procedures.
(i) Permissible Equity Investments. In addition to investments permitted
under other provisions of Regulation K, a BHC may now make the following
equity investments through a debt/equity conversion:
- up to 100 percent of the shares of any foreign company, which shares are
acquired from the government of the country or its agencies or instrumen-
talities (i.e., a privatization of a public sector company); and
- up to 40 percent of the shares of any private sector company, provided that:
(A) a BHC may acquire more than 25 percent of the voting shares of
such company only if another shareholder or control group of share-
holders not affiliated with the BHC owns a larger block of voting shares
of such company; and
(B) the BHC may not have a greater representation on the board of
directors or management committees of the foreign company than is
proportional to the shares it holds in such company.
By permitting a BHC to own up to 25 (and under certain circumstances up to
40) percent of the voting shares of the foreign company, the Board enabled BHCs
to have not merely portfolio, but "operational," investments in private sector
nonfinancial companies. The Board believes that BHCs will be able to have an
important voice in the management of the companies through proportionate,
noncontrolling representation on their boards of directors. A BHC should be able
to protect its investment in a nonfinancial company, the Board feels, without
having the sole operational control over the company, which a BHC is
ill-equipped to exercise. Also, holding 20 percent or more of the shares of
nonfinancial companies will allow BHCs to use consolidation or equity account-
ing, rather than cost accounting, in respect of such investments.
(ii) Permissible Debt Financing. If a BHC acquires 20 percent or more of
the voting shares of a nonfinancial private sector company, it will not be
permitted to extend loans or other forms of financing to such company in excess
of 50 percent of the total loans or extensions of credit to such company.
(iii) Permissible Holding Period. BHCs will be permitted to retain invest-
ments made pursuant to debt/equity conversions for a period of two years beyond
the end of any period established by the host country restricting the repatriation
of such investment, but in no event for more than fifteen years. This holding
period will apply to investments in both public and private sector companies. Its
imposition reflects the Board's view that investments of 20 percent or more in the
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voting stock of nonfinancial companies are intended to be temporary, and
upholds the Board's general objective of maintaining the separation between
banking and commerce. The divestment requirement at the end of the holding
period is not applicable, however, to investments otherwise permissible under
Regulation K, even if such investments resulted from debt/equity conversions.
(iv) General Consent Procedures. The Board grants a general consent to
investments made pursuant to the February 1988 amendment if the total amount
invested does not exceed the greater of $15 million or 1 percent of the equity of
the BHC. Prior notice to, or the specific consent of, the Board is required,
however, if a country's debt/equity conversion program requires the BHC to
invest new money after converting debt obligations to equity, if the amount of
such new money exceeds $15 million or if the investment is to be made through
an insured bank or its subsidiary.
(v) Investments to Be Held through the Holding Company. Debt-for-equity
investments in nonfinancial companies are required to be held through a BHC and
not directly by a bank or a subsidiary of a bank. The Board thus sought to protect
banks from the potential risks of investments in commercial and industrial com-
panies, and to make it clear that the federal safety net does not apply to nonbanking
activities. The Board is willing, however, to grant exceptions to this general
requirement on a case-by-case basis if it can be demonstrated that there is a special
reason (e.g., local legal requirements) why a bank, rather than a BHC, must hold
the investment in the nonfinancial company.
(vi) Private Sector Debt Not Eligible for Debt/Equity Conversion. Despite
comment urging the contrary, the Board has limited application of the liberalized
investment rules to equity investments made through the conversion of sovereign
debt, thus excluding the swapping of private sector debt. In support of its
position, the Board noted that a bank can already convert private sector debt to
an equity investment through the use of the "debt previously contracted"
exception, whereas, according to the Board, sovereign debt is not eligible for
such conversion.
(vii) Some Observations on the February 1988 Amendment. Although the
February 1988 amendment provides a useful liberalization of Regulation K, the
ability of banks to do debt/equity conversions has not been significantly
enhanced. BHCs may now own up to 25 percent of the voting stock of a
nonfinancial company (or up to 40 percent if another stockholder holds a larger
block), whereas previously they were limited to less than 20 percent. The power
to acquire this relatively small additional amount of voting stock has, however,
been coupled with limitations on the permissible holding period of the invest-
ment, the amount of debt financing that may also be provided, the manner in
which the investment may be held, and the type of debt that is eligible for
conversion.
The Board in its August 1987 amendment permitted BHCs to acquire 100
percent of a public sector company pursuant to a debt/equity conversion. Since
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public sector companies are likely to have been less well-managed than private
sector companies, the acquisition of a 100 percent interest in a private sector
company would present less commercial risk to a BHC than a public sector
company and should, a fortiori, also be permitted. Such treatment would be
consistent with the purpose of the "debt previously contracted" exception
described below, namely, to enable a bank to exchange debt for an equity
interest, without limit as to the percentage of voting stock, if the bank believes
such exchange is a reasonable step toward collecting on its loan. The "dpc"
exception is a very limited but well-established departure from the general
principle of the separation of banking and commerce. The Board would,
therefore, have ample precedent for permitting BHCs to acquire up to 100
percent of private, as well as public, sector companies.
C. OTHER LEGAL BASES FOR HOLDING AN
EQUITY INVESTMENT IN FOREIGN COMPANIES
Assuming that an Investor cannot make an investment under the eligible
investment categories of the newly amended Regulation K, there are nonetheless
several alternative legal bases on which an Investor may rely to acquire equity in
a foreign company. The most flexible of these is the "dpc" exception, which
permits an Investor to acquire an equity investment in exchange for a "debt
previously contracted." Of more limited use to an Investor are two exceptions to
the general prohibitions of the BHCA that permit an Investor to acquire directly,
or indirectly through an investment company, up to 5 percent of the voting stock
of a company.
1. The "Debt Previously Contracted" Exception
The "dpc" exception permits a banking organization to acquire up to 100
percent of the voting stock of a company in exchange for a "debt previously
contracted." "Dpc" exceptions to limitations otherwise imposed by the banking
laws are found in Regulation K, the BHCA, Regulation Y, the FRA, and in state law.
a. Regulation K
Pursuant to the "dpc" exception set forth in section 211.5(e) of Regulation K,
equity interests acquired in exchange for "debts previously contracted" are not
subject to the limitations of Regulation K provided that:
(i) such equity is acquired in order to "prevent a loss on a debt previously
contracted in good faith"; and
(ii) such equity interests are disposed of no later than two years after their
acquisition, unless the Board authorizes retention for a longer period.
The "dpc" exceptions set forth in the BHCA and Regulation Y are very
similar to that of Regulation K except that they permit the Board to authorize the
retention by the BHC of conversion-generated shares for a maximum period of
five years, whereas Regulation K contains no such absolute limit.
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By means of the "dpc" exception, an Investor may acquire an unlimited
amount of the voting stock of a foreign company irrespective of whether such
company engages in non-'"permissible" activities. Thus, an Investor could
acquire voting stock in a company engaged to a substantial extent in non-
"permissible" activities such as manufacturing, mining, or tourism.
Whether the "dpc" exception is available will depend upon the facts of the
particular case. Generally speaking, this provision has been used to permit the
conversion of debt into equity of the same debtor or into equity that served as
collateral for the debt in question. The language of Regulation K, however, does
not on its face preclude a conversion into equity of a third party.
Some members of the staff of the Board, however, have apparently taken a
somewhat restrictive view of the "dpc" exception, suggesting that it may not be
used to permit the acquisition of equity in exchange for debt of a sovereign
nation. Their reasoning appears to be twofold. First, the "dpc" exception should
be limited to debtors that are bankrupt or have been declared in default. Although
some debtor nations may be in arrears on their obligations, they have not been
declared in default and, therefore, their situation is considered to be not so
serious as to justify "dpc" treatment. Second, there is concern as to how the
remainder of a banking organization's portfolio of debt of a particular country
should be treated if some of such debt has been converted to equity "in order to
prevent a loss."
The language of Regulation K, however, does not necessarily compel such a
restrictive interpretation. If a banking organization were to sell a particular loan
in the secondary market or swap it for debt of another Third World debtor it
would incur a loss that, depending on the discount at which such debt is selling,
may be substantial, irrespective of whether the debtor was bankrupt or had been
declared in default. Moreover, if it were to incur a loss on such transaction, it
would not necessarily be required to write down the rest of its portfolio of such
debt. Thus, by effecting a conversion of debt to an equity investment, a banking
organization not only might be able to "prevent a loss," but would also not
necessarily have to write down any remaining debt of the same debtor held in its
portfolio.
b. The National Banking Act
Even if the Board will not permit a BHC to undertake a conversion of debt to
equity pursuant to the "dpc" exception, the bank itself may be able to effect
such a transaction directly. Ordinarily debt/equity conversions will be effected
either at the holding company level, i.e., by the BHC itself, or by a nonbank
subsidiary of the BHC. If, however, the debt is held by the bank and is converted
by it, then the applicable laws and regulations will instead be, in the case of a
national bank, the National Banking Act and the regulations of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and, in the case of a state bank, state laws
and regulations. The OCC has interpreted the "incidental powers" clause of the
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National Banking Act as permitting the exchange of debt for equity if the bank
believes in good faith that such exchange is a reasonable and appropriate step
toward collecting a bank's loans.27 The OCC has also relied on the powers of a
national bank to hold real property received in satisfaction of a debt previously
contracted in cases where the equity in question was in a real estate holding
company. 28 The OCC is apparently prepared to give considerable weight to a
bank's determination that the exchange of debt for equity is reasonably necessary
to salvage the bank's assets.
The OCC's interpretation of the National Banking Act as permitting "dpc"
transactions is elaborated upon in two recent "No Objection" letters issued in
1987 and 198829 involving, in the first instance, an investment in a Mexican
holding company whose sole asset is a Mexican hotel and, in the second
instance, an investment in a Chilean insurance company.
If a "dpc" transaction is undertaken by a national bank pursuant to its inherent
powers under the National Banking Act, no approval or "No Objection" letter
is required to be obtained from the OCC. Nonetheless, the interpretations set
forth in the above-described "No Objection" letters will provide useful guidance
to banks making an equity investment in reliance on such powers.
c. New York State Banking Law
Under New York law, a bank "may invest in and have and exercise all rights
of ownership with respect to . . . [s]o much of the capital stock of any other
corporation as may be specifically authorized by the laws of [New York] or by
resolution of the banking board upon a three-fifths vote of all its members."
30
Additionally,
[a] bank or trust company may acquire stock in settlement or reduction of a loan, or
advance of credit or in exchange for an investment previously made in good faith and
in the ordinary course of business, where such acquisition of stock is necessary in order
to minimize or avoid loss in connection with any such loan, advance of credit or
investment previously made in good faith. 31
The New York State Banking Department takes a flexible attitude in permitting
the acquisition of stock for a debt previously contracted. If the bank reasonably
believes the acquisition of equity in exchange for debt is necessary in order to
minimize or avoid a loss in connection with a loan, and the transaction is not a
subterfuge, the Banking Department will not object.
27. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1982 & Supp. VI 1988).
28. Id. § 29.
29. Exchange of Bank's Mexican Sovereign Debt Portfolio for Interest in Privately Owned
Mexican Hotel Pursuant to Mexican Government's Debt/Equity Swap Program, Comptroller of the
Currency, No Objection Letter, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,039 (Nov. 27, 1987); Debt/Equity
Swap Transaction in Chile in Satisfaction of Debts Previously Contracted, Comptroller of the
Currency, No Obligation Letter, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,047 (May 20, 1988).
30. N.Y. BAxrNo LAW § 97(5) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
31. Id.
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2. Section 4(c)(6) of the BHCA
Assuming a banking organization cannot effect a debt/equity conversion in
reliance on Regulation K because the target company is engaged in more than
incidental business activities in the United States or in reliance on the "dpc"
exception, it still will be permitted to acquire up to 5 percent of the voting stock
of any company pursuant to section 4(c)(6) of the BHCA. This exception is
self-executing and accordingly no prior notice to, or consent by, the Board is
required. The exception is available irrespective of the nature of the business in
which the company is engaged or the extent of its activities in the United States.
Such investments, however, are required to be passive and should not involve
active participation by the Investor in the management of the company.
3. Effecting Debt/Equity Conversions through Investment Companies
Section 4(c)(7) of the BHCA permits a BHC to hold up to 100 percent of the
shares of an investment company that is not engaged in any business other than
investing in securities, provided that such securities do not represent more than
5 percent of the outstanding voting stock of any company. No comparable
provision is contained in Regulation K and the Board has not been called upon
to determine what rules would pertain to the acquisition by an Investor of shares
in an investment company that invested solely in foreign equity securities.
Since a BHC may acquire up to 25 (and under certain circumstances up to 40)
percent of the voting shares of a nonfinancial company, presumably a BHC could
acquire shares in an investment company that, in turn, could hold at least such
percentage amount of voting stock of a company. Query whether a BHC could
hold up to 25 (or 40) percent of the shares of an investment company which, in
turn, could hold any amount of the voting stock of a company? The Board's
reaction to such a proposal and variations thereof may depend, in part, on the
extent to which the BHC has excessive operational control over the company in
which the investment company is investing or whether, through the use of the
investment company vehicle, the BHC is, indirectly, investing in the target
company with one or more substantial joint venture partners that can bring
managerial and/or technical expertise to the investment.
C. U.S. ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF DEBT/EQUITY CONVERSIONS
1. Debt-for-Equity Swaps
With Regulation K having been partially liberalized, perhaps the most
significant U.S. regulatory obstacle to debt/equity conversion is U.S. accounting
treatment. The proper accounting treatment for a debt/equity conversion has been
the subject of considerable uncertainty and controversy. Recently, however, the
Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the AICPA Banking Committee have
reached substantial agreement on the appropriate treatment and have released
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AcSEC Practice Bulletin No. 4 dealing with "Accounting for Foreign Debt/
Equity Swaps." 32 Under the AcSEC Bulletin, a debt/equity swap will be treated
as an exchange transaction of a monetary asset for a nonmonetary asset, which
latter asset is to be reflected at its "fair value" on the books of the bank or BHC
as of the date the transaction is agreed to by both parties.
What is "fair value"? The Bulletin states that to determine "fair value" one
should consider the fair value of the consideration given up, i.e., the old debt,
as well as the fair value of the assets received, i.e., the equity investment,
especially if the value of the consideration given up is not readily determinable
or may not be a good indicator of the value received. The AICPA notes that since
the secondary market for debt of financially troubled countries is thin, that
market may not be the best indicator of the value of the equity investment
received. Therefore, the AICPA committees concluded that, to determine the fair
value of the equity received in a debt/equity conversion, both the secondary
market price of the debt given up and the fair value of the equity investment
received should be considered. The following factors should be considered in
determining current fair value:
" similar transactions for cash;
" estimated cash flows from the equity investment received;
* market value, if any, of similar equity investments; and
* restrictions, if any, affecting payment of dividends, the sale of the
investment or the repatriation of capital.
If the fair value of the equity investment received is less than the book value
of the debt, the resultant loss should be recognized and charged to the allowance
for loan losses and should include any discounts from the official exchange rate
that are imposed as a transaction fee. All other fees relating to the debt/equity
conversion should be charged to expense, rather than capitalized.
Will the recognition of a loss in a debt/equity conversion contaminate the
remainder of a bank's loan portfolio with respect to that debtor or country? The
Bulletin does not require that "-he remainder of the bank's debt be written down
to the same value. The AICPA notes, however, that in accordance with Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), a financial institution's loan portfolio
should be carried at amortized historical cost less both loan write-offs and the
allowance for loan losses, provided that the institution has the ability and intent
to hold the loans until their maturity. Thus the bank need not mark down such debt
to its "fair value" simply because of a debt/equity conversion. Loan write-offs
and loan loss allowances are to be taken based on management's judgment
regarding the ultimate collectibility of the loans in the normal course of business.
The recognition of a loss on a debt/equity conversion should be one of the factors
considered by management in its periodic assessment of the adequacy of its
32. Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Practice Bulletin No. 4 (May 1988).
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allowance for loan losses. If, however, management demonstrates its intention to
dispose of loans prior to maturity, the loan should be carried at cost or fair value,
whichever is lower. Thus, the recognition of a loss on a debt/equity conversion
will not require a bank to write down the remainder of its loans to the same
borrower, but the occurrence of such recognition should be taken into account by
the bank in determining the adequacy of its allowance for loan losses.
In practice, will this proposed treatment require more than an insignificant
write-down of the value of the equity asset received? If the "fair value" of such
equity must take into account the secondary market value of the debt given up,
as well as the U.S. dollar value of a local currency-denominated equity interest
that is not readily convertible into hard currency, it is possible that more than an
insignificant loss will result. Thus, for an equity investment in Mexico acquired
in exchange for debt selling at approximately 40 percent of par, the loss might
well be 25 to 45 percent. If such is the case, some banks may be discouraged
from undertaking debt/equity conversions until such time as their reserves are
adequate to absorb such losses. Even then, they may prefer to hold on to such
debt or, alternatively, to sell it, realize the loss, and no longer have to worry
about their exposure to the developing country in question.
2. Debt-for-Debt Swaps
The market among banks for debt-for-debt swaps was severely dampened by
the AICPA's "Notice to Practitioners" of May 198533 and the OCC Banking
Circular 200, 3 4 both of which provided that a swap of loans to different debtors
represented an exchange of monetary assets that should be accounted for at fair
value. The OCC's Circular went even further and stated that, for loan swaps
involving loans to debtors of foreign countries that are currently experiencing
financial difficulties, "it is presumed the estimated fair values will be less than
the respective face values of the loans and other consideration [given up]. As-
suming the general presumption is not overcome, this would result in a loss on
the swap."
Now that many banks have established substantial reserves for their Third
World debt and have indicated a willingness to realize losses in dealing with such
debt, it -can be expected that there will be more debt-for-debt swapping. If,
however, the loss realized in the swap of debt is quite similar to that which would
be realized if the debt were simply sold for cash, banks may prefer to sell, rather
than swap, their debt if they are prepared to realize the loss.
II. Some Suggestions for Structuring Equity Investments
In order to avoid some of the limitations placed upon U.S. banks by
Regulation K and the BHCA on acquiring voting stock of nonfinancial entities,
33. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Notice to Practitioners (May 1985).
34. Accounting for Loan Swaps, Comptroller of the Currency Banking Circular 200, 4 Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 51,145 (May 22, 1985).
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and to avoid the restrictions imposed by certain debtor nations on foreign
investment generally, investors may need to consider some creative structuring
techniques.
Additionally, since the equity investments into which banks will be converting
their debt will be subject not only to the vagaries of the profitability of such
investments, but also to the risk of devaluation of the local currency, banks quite
naturally will want to protect themselves as much as possible from both these
risks. To reduce these risks a bank might concentrate on investments that have a
high foreign exchange earning capability, such as the manufacture of exports and
tourist resorts, or might obtain insurance, if available, from The Overseas Private
Investment Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency
(especially for inconvertibility risks) in appropriate cases.
Such risks, as well as the limitations on acquiring voting stock imposed by
Regulation K and the BHCA, may be alleviated by using a nonvoting preferred
stock that has attributes similar to those of debt and adopting one or more of the
following "bells and whistles":
1. The dividends on the preferred stock could be cumulative and mandatorily
payable as soon as the venture has sufficient profits.
2. A sinking fund arrangement could be established into which funds would
be deposited for subsequent use in paying dividends on, and ultimately
redeeming, the preferred stock.
3. The issuer of the preferred stock could be an entity within an affiliated
group that would be structured so that, even if the overall venture were
not profitable, the particular entity issuing the preferred stock could be the
beneficiary of contractual arrangements that would assure it sufficient
profitability to service the dividends due on such stock.
4. To protect against the devaluation of the local currency, it might be
possible to adjust or index the dividend and redemption payments so as to
reflect inflation or changes in exchange rates. Alternatively, the preferred
stock could have a bonus dividend that would compensate for losses due
to devaluation.
Whether any of such arrangements will work in a particular country will
depend upon local laws, the regulations applicable to debt/equity conversions,
and regulations affecting remittances of foreign exchange in respect of divi-
dends.
Because BHCs are generally limited by U.S. regulations to owning up to 25
(and under certain circumstances up to 40) percent of a company's voting stock
(assuming the investments are not banking or financial in nature or are not
necessary to prevent a loss on a debt previously contracted, in which case more
voting stock may be acquired), they are logical minority partners for U.S.and
other industrial companies that desire to establish or expand an operation in one
of the debtor countries. By selling a minority equity interest to a bank, an
industrial company can obtain outside financing in local currency (which at times
may be otherwise difficult) at a relatively reasonable cost. By so doing, it can
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also share the equity risks of investment with a minority partner with whom it
feels comfortable. The banks, on the other hand, will also feel comfortable being
a minority partner of an industrial company that will have operational control
over the business and with which they may well have an existing customer
relationship in the United States.
III. Securitization and Collateralization of
Existing Debt: The Mexican Debt Exchange
Schemes to turn part of the LDC debt into securities that would be tradeable
on a securities exchange, rather than merely in the informal secondary market for
LDC debt, have been fantasized about by investment and commercial bankers,
and their lawyers and accountants, for several years. Such schemes have
frequently included credit enhancement devices, such as guarantees by multilat-
eral financial institutions or collateral consisting of U.S. Treasury obligations.
The goal has been to create a new instrument that, fulfilling the alchemist's
dream, has a value in the market place exceeding the cost or value of its
constituent components. The Mexican Debt Exchange, although not the only
such scheme to see the light of day, is certainly the most ambitious and
noteworthy to date.
A. THE BASIC OUTLINE OF THE MEXICAN DEBT EXCHANGE
Pursuant to an Invitation for Bids,35 Mexico on January 18, 1988, offered to
exchange a new issue of Mexican Collateralized Floating Rate Bonds Due 2008
(Bonds), denominated in U.S. dollars, paying interest at a floating rate and
maturing in twenty years, in exchange for certain existing obligations of Mexico
outstanding under its Restructure and New Money Agreements. The Bonds were
to be secured, as to their principal only and not as to interest, by non-interest-
bearing U.S. Treasury obligations (Zeroes), which were to be purchased by
Mexico using its own reserves. The Zeroes were to be pledged to holders of the
Bonds and have a maturity date and principal amount payable at maturity to
match the maturity date and principal amount of the Bonds. In the event of a
default under the Bonds, a bondholder would not have access to the Zeroes until
the final, originally scheduled maturity date, at which time the proceeds of the
Zeroes would be available to pay the principal of the Bonds at maturity.
Banks desiring to exchange their existing debt for Bonds were invited to
submit bids on a voluntary basis to the exchange agent, Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company of New York. In its bids, each bank was asked to specify the principal
35. Invitation from Gustavo Petrocelli, Minister of Finance and Public Credit of the United
Mexican States, to the Banks Party to Mexico's Public Sector Restructure and New Restructure
Agreements and 1983 and 1984 New Money Agreements, to Exchange Existing Indebtedness for
United Mexican States Collateralized Floating Rate Bonds Due 2008 (Jan. 18, 1988).
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amount of eligible existing Mexican debt obligations (the Eligible Debt) that the
bank was willing to tender and the principal dollar amount of Bonds that the bank
would accept in exchange for such Eligible Debt. For example, a bank could
state in its bid that it was willing to tender $10 million of Eligible Debt and would
accept in exchange therefor Bonds with a principal dollar amount of $7 million,
thereby indicating its willingness to accept a discount of the principal amount of
its Eligible Debt equal to 30 percent.
To enhance their attractiveness to the banks and, ultimately, to third parties,
the Bonds have the following features:
(i) The Bonds pay interest at a margin of 15/8 percent above LIBOR, which
is double the margin of '16 percent currently payable by Mexico on the
Eligible Debt;
(ii) The Bonds are listed on the Luxembourg stock exchange;
(iii) The Bonds, according to Mexico, will not be subject to future
restructurings or reschedulings that might otherwise apply to its Eligible
Debt; and
(iv) Also according to Mexico, neither the Bonds nor the Eligible Debt given
in exchange will be considered part of any base amount for purposes of
future requests by Mexico for new money.
B. CONSENTS AND WAIVERS
In order to issue the Bonds, it was necessary for Mexico to obtain a waiver of
the negative pledge provisions under its outstanding credit agreements and, in the
case of one credit agreement that did not permit an exchange offer, even if
unsecured, the waiver of mandatory prepayment and sharing provisions. In
addition, it was necessary for Mexico to collateralize certain outstanding
publicly held bond issues since it was not practicable to obtain a waiver of the
negative pledge provisions relating to such issues.
C. THE RESULTS OF THE BiD
Mexico and Morgan Guaranty had publicly stated that they expected up to $20
billion of Eligible Debt would be tendered and, projecting that the banks would
tender at a 40 to 50 percent discount, the total amount of new bonds issued was
predicted to be as high as $10 billion. The results of the auction were much less
dramatic. Over $6 billion of Eligible Debt was tendered, but Mexico accepted
only those obligations tendered at an exchange ratio of 74.99 percent or less,
with the result that Mexico accepted $3.67 billion of debt to be exchanged for
$2.56 billion of Bonds. Thus, the average exchange ratio of the accepted bids
was 69.77 percent. Upon completion of the exchange, Mexico will have
succeeded in reducing its outstanding indebtedness by $1.1 billion, an amount
substantially lower than the reduction of $10 billion originally envisioned.
Although the results seem disappointing in light of such expectations, the
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transaction justifiably deserves to be considered a moderate success, not only
because it did achieve a reduction of Mexico's debt of $1.1 billion, but also
because it shows that debt securitization and collateralization schemes can play
a significant role in the management and reduction of LDC debt.
D. ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF THE MEXICAN DEBT EXCHANGE
Perhaps the two most important issues confronting the banks in evaluating the
Mexican Debt Exchange were the accounting treatment of the exchange and the
value that the marketplace would put on the Bonds. Three principal accounting
issues were raised by the Exchange.
1. Accounting Treatment of the Exchange Itself
Price Waterhouse rendered an opinion to Morgan Guaranty on the appropriate
accounting treatment for the transaction, concluding that the exchange of
Eligible Debt for the Bonds should be treated as an exchange of monetary
assets. 36 As a result, a bank would recognize an accounting loss or gain equal to
the difference between the carrying value of its Eligible Debt on its books prior
to the exchange and the "fair value" of the Bonds received in exchange. Such
loss should generally be recorded as a charge to the allowance for loan losses.
The amount of the loss was affected not only by the discount factor at which a
bank exchanged its Eligible Debt for the Bonds, but also by the amount by which
the fair value of the Bonds received exceeded the face value of such Bonds.
"Fair value" normally is equal to market value if a broad-based, active market
exists. Since it may take some time for such a market for the Bonds to develop,
banks will need to use other appropriate valuation techniques, such as discounted
cash flow analysis, to determine fair value.
Some accountants have argued that the Mexican Debt Exchange be treated not
as an exchange of monetary assets with the Bonds being booked at "fair value,"
but rather as part of a troubled debt restructuring pursuant to Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 15, "Accounting by Debtors and Creditors
for Troubled Restructurings" (FAS No. 15). If the exchange of Bonds for
Eligible Debt were considered a restructuring of the Eligible Debt, FAS No. 15
would not require a bank to write down the value of its restructured loan unless
the amount of the loan on its books exceeded the total future cash receipts,
including both principal and interest, to be received by the bank pursuant to the
restructured terms of the debt. Since the total payments of principal plus interest
over the twenty-year life of the Bonds would clearly exceed the recorded value
of the Eligible Debt on the books of the banks prior to the exchange, no loss would
be required to be recognized. It should be noted that FAS No. 15 has its critics.
36. Id. app. III (letter from Price Waterhouse).
37. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
169.
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2. Accounting Treatment of Debt Tendered but Not Accepted by Mexico
Under GAAP, a bank should carry a loan it has the intent and ability to hold
to maturity at its historical cost less the allowance for loan losses. If, however,
management clearly demonstrates its intent to dispose of a loan or a group of
loans prior to maturity, then such loans should be carried at cost or market,
whichever is lower. Because Price Waterhouse viewed the Mexican Debt
Exchange as a unique opportunity, it concluded that if management does not have
a present intention to dispose of the Eligible Debt other than through the tender
offer, the mere act of tendering Eligible Debt that is not accepted by Mexico does
not necessarily constitute a clear intention to dispose of such loans prior to
maturity.
The staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission has, however, taken a
contrary view in its Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 75 (SAB No. 75), which sets
forth the SEC staff's views regarding certain accounting disclosure issues
applicable to the Mexican Debt Exchange. SAB No. 75 states:
The tender of the existing loans is an event that must be given accounting recognition
either (i) by writing the loans down to the price at which the bank has agreed to accept
Bonds in the tender (tender price) or (ii) by increasing, as necessary, the allowance for
loan losses to an amount sufficient to result in a net carrying value of the loans tendered
that equals the tender price.
3. Treatment of Debt Not Tendered to Mexico
Price Waterhouse opined that, even though a bank exchanges part of its
Eligible Debt for Bonds and recognizes a loss on the exchange, the accounting
treatment of the bank's untendered Eligible Debt should not change solely by
reason of the fact that a portion of the bank's Eligible Debt was exchanged, so
long as the bank has the ability and intent to hold such remaining loans to
maturity. The SEC staff in SAB No. 75 did point out, however, that pursuant to
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, "Accounting for
Contingencies," management has a continuing responsibility to assess the
adequacy of the allowance for loan losses relative to untendered Mexican debt
to ensure that such allowance is adequate to provide for losses due to ultimate
collectibility, including anticipated losses from the sale, swap, or other
exchange of loans.
F. SEcuRrrmEs LAWS AsPEcrs
The Bonds were issued in registered definitive form. They were not registered
under U.S. securities laws, but were sold to U.S. persons pursuant to a private
placement, with appropriate legends and restrictions on transfer. Bonds issued
outside the United States to purchasers not U.S. persons were required, for a
period of ninety days after issuance, not to be sold in the United States or to U.S.
persons. The Bonds to be issued to non-U.S. persons were initially represented
by a single, temporary global bond. Individual Bonds were issued to non-U.S.
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persons ninety days after the closing date for the transaction upon appropriate
antiflowback certifications by such persons.
G. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE MEXICAN DEBT EXCHANGE
The Mexican Debt Exchange deserves genuine recognition for blazing a new
trail in the quest for solutions to the debt crisis. A number of criticisms and
comments have, however, been put forth that should be taken into consideration
and evaluated:
1. The fact that Mexico itself had to purchase with its own reserves the
Zeroes to collateralize the Bonds renders the scheme impracticable to
most developing countries, which have limited reserves.
2. The requirement by the SEC in SAB No. 75 that Eligible Debt tendered
but not accepted by Mexico be written down to the tender price, or that
sufficient loan-loss reserves be maintained to reflect a carrying value of
such debt equal to the tender price, discouraged some banks from
participating in the tender.
3. The transaction perhaps could have been structured to qualify as a FAS
No. 15 troubled debt restructuring, thereby avoiding the immediate
financial accounting loss suffered by banks that participated in the
exchange.
4. Mexico was unrealistic in anticipating that banks would tender their
Eligible Debt at a discount that, when combined with the market discount
of the Bonds, would result in an overall discount in excess of that at which
the Eligible Debt was trading in the secondary market.
5. The interest payable on the Bonds was purely Mexican credit risk,
depressing the anticipated market price at which the Bonds would trade.
Some credit enhancement, such as a one-year rolling forward guaranty as
has been suggested by Secretary Brady, might be desirable to support
Mexico's interest obligation.
With the financial and credit enhancement support that Secretary Brady has
suggested will be forthcoming from the World Bank and the IMF, it is expected
that new debt securitization and collateralization schemes will be proposed in
reliance on credit support from such institutions.
IV. Conclusion
The substantial increase in loan-loss reserves and the overall strengthening of
bank capital have provided banks with much greater flexibility in managing their
LDC loan portfolio. Thus, banks are much more willing and able to realize the
accounting losses that ordinarily follow from effecting debt/equity conversions,
debt-for-debt swaps, or debt exchanges similar to that of the Mexican Exchange.
The Board's recent liberalization of Regulation K has alleviated to a certain
extent one of the regulatory hurdles to debt/equity conversions. Such conversions
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can be a powerful tool not only in reducing the LDC debt burden, as Chile has
demonstrated, but also in serving as an engine of growth in encouraging new
capital investment. Similarly, debt securitization and collateralization schemes
can be quite effective in reducing the LDC debt burden while at the same time
giving the banks, especially those seeking an exit vehicle from LDC lending,
flexibility in determining whether to retain or liquidate their LDC debt.
These techniques and others currently being developed cannot, singly, be
viewed as a "solution" to the LDC debt problem. However, taken together they
can, if not unduly restricted by government regulations, accounting rules, and
loan agreement provisions, produce a gradual reduction in the debt burden to a
level that the principal debtor nations should be able to manage comfortably. It
is hoped that, with the support of the U.S. Government, as demonstrated by
Secretary Brady's announcement of a new U.S. policy initiative for dealing with
the LDC debt problem, other OECD governments, the World Bank, and the IMF,
the LDC nations will be able to achieve substantial debt reduction through
debt/equity conversions, debt securitization and collateralization schemes, and
other innovative transactions.
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